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International Workshop “Power-Knowledge” or “State Apparatus”?
The Theory and History of  the Subject and 
Domination of  the Self  and Others:  
From Althusser to Foucault
Yoshiyuki Koizumi
Abstract: In this paper, I attend to the problem of  domination with the aim of  re-examining the 
relationship between Althusser and Foucault.  Consequently, I suggest that the research and writings 
of  Michel Foucault in the 1970s were largely responses to Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses” (1970).  At the end of  the 1970s, Foucault recognized two turns in the evolution of  
his own work over a decade.  The first turn relates to Foucault’s texts on the functions of  the mental 
hospital, which, as this paper shows, focused on the dominating subject.  The paper shows that 
the second turn, revealed in Foucault’s discussion of  the family, focused primarily on the subject 
pursuing the domination of  others through self-domination.  While a great number of  issues remain to 
be resolved, this examination suggests that Foucault engaged in sustained reflections on the problems 
posed by Althusser.  Based on the above discussion, the paper suggests that the relations between the 
writings of  Foucault and Althusser or Marxism should be revisited and questioned anew.
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1. Foucault’s Two Shifts in the 1970s
In this essay, I argue that the research activities and writings of  Michel Foucault in the 
1970s evolved as responses to Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” 
(1970).  Althusser’s name evidently does not feature in Foucault’s texts that appear to engage 
with the former’s concepts.  Consequently, the responses seem to be largely indirect.  However, 
paying attention to the problems of  the subject and domination that are common in the works 
of  Althusser and Foucault leads to the recognition that Foucault’s perspectives in various 
writings were indeed responses to Althusser.  Consequently, there is a large body of  text 
concerned with this interaction.  Because it is beyond the scope of  this short essay to consider 
all of  these, here I focus chiefly on Foucault’s Lectures at the Collège de France, delivered in 
the 1970s.
In On the Government of  the Living (1979–1980), Foucault reflected on his lectures 
delivered over a period of  a decade, noting “two successive shifts” during this period.  The 
first was a shift from the notion of  dominant ideology to that of  knowledge-power, and the 
second was from the notion of  knowledge-power to that of  government by truth.1  Speaking 
of  the former shift, Foucault observed:
in spite of  the word ‘dominant,’ the concept of  dominant ideology makes us overlook all actual 
mechanisms of  subjection (assujettissement), and, as it were, throws away the cards to the others’ 
hands, saying: after all, it’s for the historians to find out how and why some in a society dominate 
others.  As opposed to this […] I tried to establish the notions of  knowledge and power.2
For Foucault, to depend upon the “dominant” ideology was to miss the actual mechanism, 
history, and cause of  domination and subjection.  This is because he held that domination 
and subjection should be studied concretely.  He, therefore, thoroughly investigated relations 
of  knowledge and power.  As Foucault was considering the problem of  the reproduction of  
domination that Althusser had earlier raised, it is not appropriate to summarize the first shift 
as one of  a transition from theorizing state power to theorizing micro power relations.  In the 
second shift, Foucault discarded the concept of  knowledge-power in turn.  He explained his 
intention as follows:
I would try to show you […] how one cannot lead men without performing the operations in the 
sphere of  truth, and operations that are always in excess of  what is useful and necessary to govern 
in an effective manner.3
 1 Michel Foucault, Du gouvernement des vivants (1979–1980), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 13.
 2 Ibid., p. 13.
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This shift should not be interpreted as marking any discontinuity between the 1970s and 
1980s.  Certainly, both the dominant ideology and the knowledge-power concepts failed to 
fully capture operations within the order of  truth.  Neither succeeded in adequately captur-
ing actual domination; therefore, both had to be discarded.  However, with the second shift, 
Foucault introduced a new concept of  “subjectivation”4 as opposed to subjection.  In order to 
reconstruct the problem of  domination, Foucault raised a searching question, namely, that of  
“how, in our civilization […] the relationship between the government of  men, the manifesta-
tion of  truth in the form of  subjectivity and the salvation for everyone has been established.”5 
To respond to the problem of  government or domination, it is necessary to analyze truth and 
salvation in relation to subjectivation.  This question covers the various forms of  subjectivity, 
ranging from the Christian6 to the revolutionary,7 further the collective.  It can be argued that 
Foucault attended to Althusser’s problem of  domination in his reconstruction of  the theory 
of  the subject.  In place of  his earlier emphasis on the bivalence of  subjection, Foucault now 
wrote about “the double meaning of  the word ‘subject’, a subject in a relationship of  power, 
subject in a demonstration of  truth.”8  His inquiry was as follows:
It has now been almost tightened up the problem: why and how does the exercise of  power in our 
society, the exercise of  power as a government of  men, demand not only acts of  obedience and 
submission, but acts of  truth in which individuals who are subjects in the relationship of  power, 
are also subjects as actors, witnessing spectators or as objects in the process of  manifestation of  
truth?  Why, in this great economy of  power relations, has developed a regime of  truth indexed 
to subjectivity?  Why is it that the power (and this for thousands of  years in our societies) asks 
individuals to say not only ‘here I am, me who obey,’ but request them, further, to say ‘this is what 
I am, me who obey, that’s what I am, this is what I have seen, this is what I have done’?9
Certainly, individuals respond to “interpellation” from the power by saying “here I am,” as 
well as through obedience and submission.  In other words, through subjection, they become 
the subject.  However, to fully become the subject within power relations requires more than 
this.  It requires of  them a confession of  the truth of  their existence, experience, and action. 
Through such subjectivation, individuals become subjects.  What Foucault was trying to sys-
tematically and historically analyze was the capability of  the subject, as such, to dominate 
 3 Ibid., p. 18.
 4 Ibid., p. 72.
 5 Ibid., p. 74.
 6 Ibid., p. 303.
 7 Michel Foucault, L’Herméneutique du sujet (1981–1982), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 200.
 8 Michel Foucault, Du gouvernement des vivants (1979–1980), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 79.
 9 Ibid., pp. 80–81.
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both the self  and others.  In this sense, it can be said that Foucault consistently considered the 
problem of  domination posed by Althusser.  To validate my argument, I will focus on only 
two points extracted from Althusser’s paper.  The first is that Ideological State Apparatuses 
(re)produce not only the dominated but the dominating.  The second point is that in their 
capacity as Ideological State Apparatuses, families have special functions.
In Althusser’s paper, the question of  the conditions of  reproduction of  a capitalist social 
formation is transposed onto those of  the relations of  production, while the latter are trans-
posed onto those of  the labor force.  Acceptance of  the vulgar opinion that salaries are deter-
mined so as to ensure the reproduction of  the labor force leads to the reframing of  a new 
question of  how the reproduction of  the qualifications of  the labor force can be ensured. 
Althusser’s response to this question was that this was warranted by the capitalist school 
system.  However, the question of  the purpose of  school education remains.  According to 
Althusser, the purpose of  education is to ensure “a reproduction of  their submission to the 
dominant ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of  the ability to properly handle the 
dominant ideology for the agents of  exploitation and repression.”10  The school system is 
thus an Ideological State Apparatus that reproduces domination and subjection, as well as 
the dominating and dominated classes.
However, Althusser argued further that “Family clearly fulfills other ‘functions’ as an 
Ideological State Apparatus.  It intervenes in the reproduction of  labor power.”11  This raises 
the question of  how the reproduction of  labor power is fulfilled within the family in any sense 
other than caring for children who will be future workers.  Regarding this point, Althusser 
emphasized the reproduction of  adult workers who submitted to the dominant ideology. 
This meant that the ruling class “properly handles the dominant ideology” within the family 
too.  Who then is the subject exercising its hegemony over the family?  This leads us precisely 
to the problem of  patriarchy.
In his analysis and transformation of  these two problems, Foucault accepted and revised 
Althusser’s theory during the 1970s.
2. Fact of  Domination
In two of  his lectures delivered in the early 1970s, Foucault examined the history of  
state apparatuses, tracing the origin of  modern state apparatuses.  In Penal Theory and 
Institutions (1971–1972), he traced the course of  the Va-Nu-Pieds Rebellion in detail, draw-
ing an explicit comparison with the situation after 1968.  Thus, he attempted to consider the 
problem of  domination after the defeat of  the revolutionary movement or civil war.
 10 Louis Althusser, Sur la reproduction, Presses Universitares de France, 1995, p. 273.
 11 Ibid., p. 282.
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In short, it is important to analyze in this situation, ‘repressive pomp,’ as a ‘manifestation of  
power’: how to understand the subjection, the re-subjection of  the class oppressed and uprising, 
and then, at the same time, the first major deployment of  the ‘arms’ of  the State irrespective of  
the person of  the king.12
This raises the question of  the type of  arms or apparatuses of  the state that develop after 
a rebellion.  Foucault’s response was that this was “the governing body of  the State.”  The 
targets of  this new type of  repressive system were no longer rebellious criminals or 
political revolutionaries, but rather the entire population that bore the possibility of  being 
delinquent.13  In reactionary times, the mode of  domination changed and the new subjection 
was imposed upon all individuals.  Broadly speaking, under the influence of  the theories 
of  absolutism, and state monopoly capitalism, Foucault perceived domination as entailing 
obedience to the sovereign and the law.
In the mid-1970s, it appears that Foucault revised his original arguments presented in 
his lectures delivered in the early 1970s, because they did not extend beyond the level of  
legal theory centered in sovereignty.  As he noted in Society must be defended (1976), “I’d 
like to close, to make, up to a point, an end to the series of  research [...] that we have been 
working for four or five years, almost since I’ve been here.”14  He subsequently developed 
the following criticism:
To say that the issue of  sovereignty is the central problem of  law in Western societies, this means 
that the discourse and technology of  law have essentially functions of  dissolving, inside the 
power, the fact of  domination.  […] The system of  law is entirely centered on the king, that is to 
say, it is ultimately an elimination of  the fact of  the domination and its consequences.  […] I have 
been trying to do the opposite, that is to say, to stress the fact of  domination in all its secrecy as 
well as in its brutality.15
For Foucault, the very fact of  domination is concealed by legal and liberal conceptions 
as well as Marxist conceptions.16  The former theories, in particular, should be discarded, 
because their application within analyses and their explanation of  subjection by voluntary 
consent or autonomous recognition render de facto domination invisible.  Foucault explained 
this as follows:
 12 Michel Foucault, Théorie et institutions pénales (1971–1972), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 7.
 13 Ibid., p. 86.
 14 Michel Foucault, “Il faut défendre la société” (1976), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 5.
 15 Ibid., p. 24.
 16 Ibid., p. 14.
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the theory of  sovereignty presupposes the subject; it aims to establish the essential unity of  
power, and it is always deployed within the prior element of  the law.  It therefore assumes triple 
‘primitiveness’: that of  the subject to subject (assujettir), that of  the unity of  the power to be 
founded and that of  legitimacy to be respected.  Subject, unity of  power and law: the theory of  
sovereignty comes into play, I think, among these elements, and it takes them as given as well as 
seeks to found them.17
Therefore, Marxism is to be criticized in so far as it plays the same game as liberalism does. 
On the contrary, it is necessary to adopt the realism of  de facto force, to theorize the origins 
of  the three elements described by Foucault, and to render visible the fact of  domination that 
liberalism and Marxism attempt to diminish or mask.  Thus, as Foucault himself  declared, 
“politics is the continuation of  war by other means.”18  He asked:
if  power is indeed the game play and deployment of  a relationship of  power, rather than analyzing 
it in terms of  transfer, contract, and alienation, or further, rather than analyzing it in functional 
terms as the reproduction of  the relations of  production, shouldn’t we be analyzing it first and 
foremost in terms of  conflict, confrontation or war?19
As Foucault pointed out, “we have to decipher war beneath peace.”20  Now, it is important to 
posit and analyze a subject that differs from the subject of  law or rights.  In contrast to “the 
universal subject that is totalizing or neutral” posited in the theory of  law, it is necessary to 
locate “the subject that talks, speaks the truth, tells the history, rediscovers the memory and 
conjures oblivion,” that is, a “warring” subject.21  Moreover, the new duality of  subjectivation 
that differs from the bivalence of  subjection must also be analyzed.  The new subject that 
emerges from subjectivation is, for example, a “subject of  history, both talking about the 
history and talked about in history.”22  Consequently, within Foucault’s research project in 
the mid-1970s, there were two separate and co-existing subjects: one submitting to law and 
sovereignty by an act of  free will, and the other submitting to the truth of  history or the exis-
tence of  itself.  Thus, new historical and theoretical studies of  various modes of  domination 
corresponding to particular subject forms were required.  Here, I present just one aspect of  
the Foucauldian research project concerning the mental hospital and the family.
 17 Ibid., p. 38.
 18 Ibid., p. 16.
 19 Ibid., p. 16.
 20 Ibid., p. 43.
 21 Ibid., pp. 45–46.
 22 Ibid., p. 117.
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3. A Normal Man as a Subject that Dominates the Self  and Others
Whereas Althusser conceived of  the school and family as principal apparatuses for pro-
ducing the ruling class, Foucault viewed the mental hospital as a “dispositif of  knowledge,”23 
constituting the epistemological subject that dominates others.  In On the Punitive Society 
(1972–1973), Foucault observed:
Thus, the psychiatric hospital is the institutional place where and by which crazies are excluded; at 
the same time and by the same function of  this expulsion, it is a hotbed of  constitution and recon-
stitution of  a rationality that is authoritatively established in the context of  power relations within 
the hospital and that will be reabsorbed […] even outside the hospital in the form of  a scientific 
discourse that will circulate as knowledge about madness, for which the condition of  possibility 
of  it to be rational is precisely the hospital.24
Of  interest to Foucault was certainly the exclusion of  the mad from society, their confinement 
in the hospital, and their subjection to the power of  the hospital.  At the same time, however, 
and extending beyond this, Foucault’s interest lay in the fact that the subject as psychiatrist 
dominates the mad, making madness into an object to be understood or explained and exer-
cising knowledge-power.  Such a subject, established through the objectification of  mental 
illness within the psychological sciences, makes the entire population an object of  rational 
knowledge, and occupies a position intended to “properly handle the dominant ideology.” 
Thus, the dispositif of  knowledge as the psychiatric hospital is more effective than that of  the 
school for strengthening the “dominant” ideology.  This point deserves special emphasis, as 
confirmed by Foucault in both Psychiatric Power (1973–1974) and Abnormal (1974–1975), 
which argue that the insane, the sick, the criminal, and women and children are not con-
sidered as subjects, but as objects of  the subject of  knowledge-power.  Moreover, they are 
described, so to speak, as human materials to be individualized.  Thus, the subject and the 
object of  knowledge indirectly enter into a relationship of  domination.  Contrary to prevail-
ing opinion, Foucault’s focus was on the former rather than on the latter.
Whereas Althusser considered the family to be an Ideological State Apparatus, Foucault 
analyzed this within the conceptual framework of  sovereignty theory.  In other words, he 
conceptualized the modern family within a patriarchal framework aligned with the disciplin-
ary dispositif of  the school, army, and prison.  Thus, Foucault asserted:
Just as the disciplinary type of  power existed in medieval societies, in which schemas of  sover-
 23 Ibid., p. 30.
 24 Michel Foucault, La Société punitive (1972–1973), Gallimard/Seuil, pp. 5–6.
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eignty nevertheless outweighed, so too, I think, forms of  the power of  sovereignty can still be 
found in contemporary society.  Where can we find them?  Well, I would find them in the only 
institution, not in the traditional dynasty of  schools, barracks, prisons, etc., that I have not yet 
spoken about, and the absence of  which may have surprised you; I mean the family.  I was going to 
say that the family is a remnant, but this is not entirely the case.  At any rate, it seems to me that 
the family is a kind of  cell within which the power exercised is not, as is usually said, disciplinary, 
but rather of  the same type as the power of  sovereignty.25
Foucault regarded the family as “the hinge point of  connection absolutely essential to the 
functioning of  all disciplinary systems,” and “constraint instance that will set individuals on 
disciplinary apparatuses.”26  Here is the core of  Foucault’s theory of  patriarchy.  It remains 
unchanged in his books written in the 1970s and 1980s.  In The Use of  Pleasure, the sexual 
subject, whose history was traced by Foucault, is, in fact, the ethical subject, and, what is 
more, it is essentially constituted in relation to the self.  This subject is of  course male and, 
it should be once again emphasized, it is the normal, heterosexual, and (active) homosexual. 
How such a subject is produced, logico-historically, raises a new question in the struggle to 
develop a new research field of  domination.  For the moment, Foucault’s response has been 
only negative.  He rejected a series of  concepts, notably incest prohibition, male domination, 
and the subjection of  women, considering them useless.27  However, it must not be under-
stood that the male subject does not have a bearing on those concepts.  He is the subject 
who exchanges women in conformity with the incest prohibition, dominates others by tak-
ing advantage of  his male status, and submits women to oneself.  Even though this is the 
case, what Foucault intended to say was that as long as we used these concepts, patriarchal 
domination and submission could not explain the history and origin of  the male subject.  It is 
widely known that Foucault repeatedly asserted that power not only denies but also induces 
pleasures and produces desires.  If  this was not the case, people could not be expected to 
submit to power.28  This point is clarified as follows.  Even if  there are men who regard them-
selves as neither owning nor ruling women; men whom we could view in terms of  the liberal 
and democratic subject, the problem still remains as to how such men are constituted and 
reproduced.  The reason why this problem has to be tackled on its own is precisely because 
such men dominate others through self-domination, although the logic and history of  this 
line of  thought were not yet fully elucidated by Foucault.  In some ways, it could be said 
that Foucault attempted to theorize the different formations and development of  (normal 
 25 Michel Foucault, Le pouvoir psychiatrique (1973–1974), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 81.
 26 Ibid., p. 82.
 27 Michel Foucault, L’usage des plaisirs : Histoire de la sexualité 2, Gallimard, 1984, p. 22.
 28 Michel Foucault, “Entretien avec Michel Foucault” (no. 192, 1976/1977), Dits et Écrits (Quarto) II, 
pp. 148–149.
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heterosexual) man differently from Freud’s theory of  the Oedipus complex and Althusser’s 
theory of  the subject.
Evidently, in The Use of  Pleasure, Foucault studied the history of  the forms of  male 
power and freedom, the history of  the forms of  moral subjectivation, that is, male subjec-
tivation.  In Subjectivity and Truth (1980–1981) too, Foucault examined the “male act and 
the social privilege of  the male,”29 and “a man’s status and a status of  manhood.”30  He then 
analyzed “the man’s relation of  self-control” and considered “the relationship mastery of  a 
man over his wife or another.”31  Thus, from the late 1970s to the 1980s, Foucault continued 
to engage with the problem of  domination, and with patriarchal domination, in particular, as 
“the hinge point” of  all disciplinary systems.
As the above discussion suggests, Foucault consistently reflected on the problems posed 
by Althusser’s paper.  Consequently, the relation between Foucault and Althusser or Marxism 
should be questioned anew.
 29 Michel Foucault, Subjectivité et Vérité (1980–1981), Gallimard/Seuil, p. 260.
 30 Ibid., p. 265.
 31 Ibid., p. 267.
